We formulate a game-theoretical model of closed rule legislation in the presence of informational asymmetries. In the model an agenda setter with private information proposes a policy to a legislature. The agenda setter's proposals require the legislature's approval by supermajority. The legislature appoints an oversight committee to monitor the agenda setter. We study the rationale for the appointment of an oversight committee, and analyze the equilibrium oversight committee member choices for the legislators. We conclude that it is optimal for the legislators to appoint oversight committee members that are biased in the opposite direction and to the same extent than is the agenda setter, rather than do the monitoring themselves. The appointment of such oversight committee members represents a credible means for the legislators to commit to reject certain proposals from the agenda setter without redistributing formal voting power.
Introduction
Delegation is an important characteristic of policy making. Providing incentives to specialize in speci…c policy matters represents one of the main rationales for delegation Krehbiel, 1987 and . Legislators cannot develop expertise in all policy areas. For that reason they set up committees or other bodies to study speci…c policy domains. They often use closed rule procedures to provide these bodies with incentives to specialize. As a direct consequence, however, the delegation of authority from legislators to a committee can give rise to moral hazard problems. Therefore this relationship is often portrayed as a principal-agent relationship in the literature.
To regain control over their agent, the principals have several tools at their disposal that attempt to balance the institutional dynamics. Peress (2009) has shown that among those tools is the requirement to employ supermajority rule. If an agenda setter is powerful, the median legislator may actually prefer to consider the agenda setter's proposal under supermajority rule instead of simple majority rule. In doing so, the median legislator appoints additional veto players that are more extreme than himself and he therefore creates a credible commitment to reject proposals that he is indi¤erent over relative to the status quo. In essence the median legislator redistributes formal voting power to obtain a policy he prefers more. In this paper we argue that under asymmetric information it is no longer required that legislators redistribute their formal voting power. By making use of an oversight committee, one that only derives informal power out of its role as an information transmitter, legislators can credibly commit to reject marginally improving proposals too.
One example of legislative delegation with an oversight committee is the trade policy making in the European Union (EU). 1 Many authors argue that delegation in the area of EU external trade takes place at two levels (Damro, 2007; Kerremans, 2003) . First, there is delegation of authority from the member state governments to the legislative members in the Council. The Council is one of the EU's two main legislative bodies. It is an intergovernmental body that consists of one representative per member state. Second, there is delegation from the Council Members to the Commission: the Commission negotiates trade agreements and drafts trade policy proposals (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006) . The Commission is the EU's executive body, and it has monopoly proposal rights in the legislative process. The Council 1 For a formal analysis of delegation in the EU see Franchino (2005) then considers the Commission's proposals under supermajority rule, which is called quali…ed majority rule in the EU.
Even though the Commission's dominant role in trade policy making renders it as one of the most supranational policy areas in the EU, authors also stress the important role of the member states by pointing out the many tools at their disposal to control the Commission (Aggarwal and Fogarty, 2004; De Bièvre and Dür, 2005; Meunier, 2005) . The monitoring tool discussed in this paper is the Trade Policy Committee (TPC). 2 The TPC frequently sits at the table with the Commission. It ful…lls two basic functions. First, it provides a channel of information to the Commission on the preferences of the member states. This information may give the Commission an opportunity to alter its proposals and get them adopted in the Council. Second, the TPC directly monitors the Commission for the Council and transmits information to it.
While the …rst aspect of the TPC's function is rather clear and has been elaborately discussed in the literature, less is known about the mechanism of monitoring. Most authors limit themselves to stating that the principal monitors the agent via the TPC (Aggarwal and Fogarty, 2004 ; De Bièvre and Dür, 2005; Meunier, 2005) . The reality is somewhat more complex, that is, the member states in the Council delegate the authority to monitor the Commission to the TPC. This was emphasized, for example, by a Commission o¢ cial, who was interviewed by Damro (2007) and stated that the TPC's weekly meetings with the Commission serve as an important instrument through which member states do their best to …nd out what is happening in trade negotiations. This suggests that there is indeed an information stream from the Commission to the Council via the TPC, but that this information is noisy.
In this paper we focus on the delegation of monitoring. Since legislators appoint the members of the oversight committee, it can manipulate this committee's preferences and by consequence the credibility of the information it transmits. If the Council appoints a TPC with the same preferences as itself, noiseless information transmission between the TPC and the Council can be expected. Yet the noisy information stream observed by Damro (2007) suggests that there is more at play. The noise could be the result of the TPC's incomplete information or of its strategic use of information. In this paper we study the latter source of noise.
We present a general model of delegation in which an agenda setter is monitored by an oversight committee, both the agenda setter and the oversight committee have perfect information, and the legislature considers the agenda setter's proposals under closed rule. We can apply this framework to EU external trade policy-making and the role of the TPC. While we acknowledge the other functions of the TPC, such as signaling the preferences of the Council to the Commission, we focus on the oversight role the TPC ful…lls and on the Council's strategic considerations in the delegation of monitoring. We build our model on the closed rule model put forward by Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989) . Their model deals with heterogeneous committees, but can also be thought of as a model of a legislature that interacts with an agenda setter on the one hand, and a committee or lobbyist with a signaling role on the other hand. We extend this view by allowing the location of the signaling committee to be determined by the legislative body. The committee can then be thought of as an oversight committee that has received the authority to monitor the agenda setter. In addition we incorporate important features of EU trade policy making into our model, such as voting by supermajority rule in the legislative body. We present a general model and apply it to the EU. In the EU the Council, the Commission and the TPC play the roles of legislature, agenda setter and oversight committee, respectively. 3 Even though the sole function of the oversight committee is to transmit information about the consequences of policy, we …nd that the legislators choose to appoint oversight committee members that have preferences di¤erent from their own. In particular they appoint members who are as far away from them as is the agenda setter, but in the opposite direction. Legislators thus prefer not to have perfect information on the consequences of policies, but rather let a strategic information transmitter signal these consequences to them. By doing so, they create a credible commitment to refuse proposals that are preferred to the status quo by the agenda setter, but rep- 3 In this paper we focus on the TPC, its role and its appointment. We do not model the trade negotiations themselves, but limit ourselves to the decision making within the EU. Therefore, we do not consider the role of non-EU countries invloved in trade negotiations. Our model can be extended, however, by including such a country and assuming it plays a role in the formulation of a trade agreement. In equilibrium this country would take into account the preferences of the TPC and Council members, as does the Commission. In turn the member states would take into account the country's preferences when appointing the TPC, as they take the Commission's preferences into account. The conclusions of our model would thus not be fundamentally di¤erent if a non-EU country were included in the model. Moreover, we ignore the Parliament's role in the process. Including the Parliament in the model would merely add another veto player. The Commission would take its prefernces into account, as it takes the preferences of the pivotal TPC and Council members into account. resent only a marginal improvement for them. As a result the agenda setter proposes policies the pivotal legislators prefer to the proposals he would make in the absence of oversight or if the legislators were perfectly informed. Obtaining a closer policy compensates for informational ine¢ ciencies the legislators su¤er compared to having perfect information. The distributional losses the legislators incur as a result of the use of a closed rule, as observed by Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989) , can be reduced when the legislators can strategically choose the oversight committee members. The legislators can give the agenda setter incentives to specialize by using a closed rule, while reducing the distributional losses by appointing oversight committee members who are farther away from the agenda setter than they are themselves.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section two starts the analysis with a simple game with perfect information. We show that legislators somehow need to credibly commit to their appointed oversight committee members in order to change the policy making process. In section three we introduce asymmetric information and see that these informational asymmetries can be a substitute for redistributing formal power to create a credible commitment. In section four we analyze the oversight committee appointment process. Section …ve presents the conclusions.
Perfect information
In order to elucidate the …nding that legislators may prefer to have imperfect and asymmetric information with regards to the consequences of policy, we start by developing a model of perfect information. A comparison with the asymmetric information model allows us to study the e¤ects of imperfect information more clearly.
In a …rst step we look at the policy making process with just two institutions: a legislature and an agenda setting committee. The policy space R is assumed to be one dimensional. This dimension could re ‡ect degrees of trade liberalization, for example, with actors on the right being more in favor than actors on the left. Actors have Euclidean preferences. That is, they prefer policy results that are closer to rather than farther away from their ideal result. In particular actor x with ideal policy p x derives utility U x (p) = (p p x ) 2 from policy p. The legislature uses supermajority rule. As a result we can simplify the analysis by focusing on the two legislators who are pivotal under supermajority rule. Legislators L L and L R are the pivotal legislators under supermajority rule, with legislator L L being to the left of legislator L R : Legislators L R and L L are then pivotal for moves to the left and right, respectively. The agenda setting committee, C 1 uses simple majority rule. As a result we can represent it by its median voter (Black, 1948) .
For simplicity and without loss of generality we normalize the one-dimensional policy space such that the average ideal policy result of the two legislators is equal to zero:
= 0, as illustrated in Figure 1 . The ideal policy result of legislator L R is set equal to the value L R . The ideal policy result of legislator L L is then equal to L R . The ideal policy result of agenda setter C 1 is assumed to be equal to aL R with a 2 R. Variable a is then a measure of how extreme the agenda setter is relative to the legislature. We refer to agenda setters with a in the interval [ 1; 1] as moderate because their preferences are located between the ideal policies of legislators L L and L R . When their levels of extremeness lie outside this range, they are considered extreme. The sequence of the game with perfect information is as follows. In the …rst stage the agenda setter drafts a proposal. In the second and …nal stage the legislators vote on the proposal. If both pivotal members vote in favor of it the proposal is adopted and becomes policy, otherwise the status quo prevails.
In a game of perfect information the relevant equilibrium concept is subgame perfection. We can follow authors such as Tsebelis (1995 Tsebelis ( , 2000 and Crombez (1996) , who make use of the winset concept to …nd a range of policies that can successfully replace the status quo. It is obvious that when the status quo lies inbetween the preferences of the two pivotal legislators, that is if p 0 2 [ L R ; L R ], the winset is empty. Both legislators desire to move away from the status quo in di¤erent directions. One can also see that when the status quo is to the agenda setter's right in Figure 1 , all players prefer the agenda setter's ideal over the status quo. The equilibrium therefore depends on the location of the status quo as can be seen in Figure 2 .
In interval I, all legislators prefer the agenda setter's ideal over the status quo. In interval II, the left pivotal legislator L L no longer prefers aL R over p 0 , so the agenda setter o¤ers a proposal b = 2L R p 0 that makes legislator L L indi¤erent over it with regards to the status quo. In interval III, the status quo prevails because never do all three players want to move away from the status quo in the same direction. In interval IV, all prefer the agenda setter's ideal over the status quo. 4 In a next step, we allow for the legislators to appoint an oversight committee C 2 . This committee consists of representatives of the legislators: each legislator appoints one oversight committee member. The members appointed by legislators L L and L R are members C 2L and C 2R , respectively. The ideal policy result of oversight committee members C 2L and
Similar to the interpretation of variable a, d L and d R are then measures of how extreme the committee members are relative to the legislature. Oversight committee members with levels of extremeness in the interval [ 1; 1] are considered as moderate because their preferences are located between the ideal policies of legislators L L and L R . When their levels of extremeness lie outside this range, they are considered extreme. The situation with both extreme oversight committee members and an extreme agenda setter is depicted in Figure 3 .
The function of the oversight committee members is to advise the legislators on whether they should accept the proposal made by the agenda setter. Yet because there is still perfect information in this stage of the model, these oversight committee members have no in ‡uence in the policy making process if the legislators cannot credibly commit to the advice. Indeed, if legislator L L prefers the proposal over the status quo, no recommendation made by his oversight committee member C 2L can persuade him to vote against it. Since the agenda setter anticipates this, the subgame perfect strategy is for both the agenda setter and the legislators to ignore the oversight committee members'advice.
As a thought experiment, however, assume that the legislators are able to credibly commit to the advice prompted by their respective oversight committee member. Which committee member should a legislator appoint? Now legislators become able to add veto players to the game and to balance the institutional dynamics in their favor. For status quos to the left of legislator L L it is the left pivotal legislator that is pivotal for a move to the right. Indeed, he is the player that desires the smallest move to the right. However, as we can see in Figure 2 , without being able to commit to vote against proposals that improve only marginally over the status quo, legislator L L stands to gain little in the policy making process when the status quo is to his left. By appointing an oversight committee member C 2L that can act as a veto player and has preferences exactly in the middle of the status quo and legislator
, legislator L L can e¤ectively force the agenda setter to make a proposal that is much more pro…table for the legislator. Indeed, for all status quos to the left of legislator L L , the legislator can obtain his ideal by appointing such a veto player. A similar reasoning holds for legislator L R and his oversight committee member C 2R .
In a model of perfect information, the oversight committees need to become more than mere monitoring devices. They require formal voting power and thus a change of institutional rules to have an impact on policy. The idea to change the institutional rules to erect a credible means to reject marginal proposals is not new. A particularly novel application can be found in Peress (2009) . He argues that by adding supermajority requirements the agenda-setting powers can be balanced with veto players to enact policies that are preferred by the median voter. Yet as we will show in the following section, relaxing the assumption of perfect information renders the assumption of committing Council Members super ‡uous. Asymmetric information itself becomes a tool to credibly commit to the advice of oversight committee members, without the need to add additional extreme veto players or to redistribute formal institutional power.
Asymmetric information
In this section we introduce asymmetric information with regards to the consequences of policy. Now the oversight committee members actually monitor the agenda setter. The single function they ful…ll is to transmit information with regards to the consequences of policy to the legislators. More speci…cally, we here assume that all actors operate in the same policy space as in the previous section, but they have preferences over policy results rather than policies as such. The result of policy p is represented by r(p) = p + !, where ! represents an external shock that is uniformly distributed over the unit interval, ! U [0; 1]. Whereas all players know the distribution of the shock, the actual realization of ! is knowledge that can only be obtained by specializing. We assume, in the vocabulary of Krehbiel (1987, 1989) , that the cost of specialization is su¢ ciently low so that the closed rule provides the agenda setter with su¢ cient incentives to specialize, even when the agenda setter's distributive gains from specialization are reduced by oversight. We come back to this issue at the end of the section. We further assume that the information obtained by specialization can be perfectly inferred by monitoring. As such oversight committee members acquire perfect information without engaging in costly research 5 . Therefore, in theory, the legislators may choose to do the oversight themselves, or they may appoint an oversight committee member with exactly the same preferences as themselves, and have perfect information with regards to the consequences of policy. But, as we will see, they prefer not to do so and to appoint oversight committee members with diverging preferences. A …nal and technical assumption is that we impose the following restrictions: (1 + a)L R < 1=4 and L R < 1=8. This ensures that all of the intervals identi…ed in the equilibria lie within the interval of the random variable [0; 1].
Previously, in the case of perfect information with commitment, the legislators knew the location of the status quo before they appoint the oversight committee members. Therefore they could appoint the members based on the location of the status quo. Under asymmetric information this is no longer a feasible strategy because asymmetric information in ‡uences the timing and play of events: the policy making process in which information is revealed occurs after the appointment of the oversight committee. Therefore legislators need to anticipate what happens in the policy making process and appoint their oversight committee member to maximize the expected return in that process.
The sequence of events in the policy making process is as follows. In the …rst stage the agenda setter and the oversight committee members learn the value of the external shock !. In the second stage the agenda setter drafts a proposal b. Moreover, the oversight committee members C 2L and C 2R simultaneously send out private signals s 2L and s 2R , respectively, to their respective legislators on the value of the external shock !. These signals are continuous variables that can be interpreted as the reported values of !. A signal is said to be consistent if the value of the shock, as reported by the oversight committee member, matches with the value of the shock that the agenda setter's proposal suggests. In the …nal stage legislators L L and L R vote on the proposal. The legislators do not observe the shock !, but they observe the bill b and the signal of their oversight committee member, s 2L or s 2R . If both the legislators accept the bill, the policy is adopted. Otherwise the status quo prevails.
During the policy making process the variables a, d L and d R are exogenous which result in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. It characterizes agenda setter C 1 's equilibrium proposal strategy b (!), oversight committee members C 2L and C 2R 's equilibrium signaling strategies s 2L (!) and s 2R (!), the equilibrium beliefs g L (b; s 2L ) and g R (b; s 2R ) of the legislators, and the legislators'voting strategies v L (b; s 2L ) and
While a is …xed throughout the entire game 6 , d L and d R are chosen during the appointment process. A change in these values can yield drastically di¤erent types of equilibria in the policy making process. However, certain types of equilibria make more sense than others. We discuss the equilibrium for
. This means that each oversight committee member is to the left of the legislator who appointed him, but not farther away from that legislator than is the agenda setter. We do not discuss the equilibria in the policy making process for other values of the variables d L and d R ; that is, for other locations of the oversight committee members, because it is easy to see that the legislators would not appoint such oversight committee members in equilibrium. First, a legislator would not appoint an oversight committee to his right, because the agenda setter is also to his right. He strictly prefers to appoint an oversight committee member with the same preferences as himself. Suppose for instance that legislator L L chooses d L > 1 and that the oversight committee member C 2L is thus to the legislator's right. If the oversight committee member is to the agenda setter's right, the signal the oversight committee member sends is clearly less trustworthy than the information the legislator derives from the proposal the agenda setter makes. If the oversight committee member is located between the legislator and the agenda setter, the legislator does not trust a signal by his committee member. Since committee member C 2L is then closer to the agenda setter than is legislator L L , he has an incentive to send a positive signal too often. For those situations where the status quo result is between the legislator and his committee member, C 2L may signal to accept a proposal, while the legislator prefers the status quo. Furthermore, for those values of the status quo result for which all players prefer a move to the right, the committee member is willing to accept policy changes too far to the right from legislator L L 's viewpoint. The legislator then prefers to be perfectly informed by a committee member with d L = 1 rather then by a committee member with d L > 1. The analysis for d R and legislator L R is similar.
Second, appointing an oversight committee member who is farther away from him than is the agenda setter is not optimal for a legislator either. The signal the legislator receives from the oversight committee member is then less trustworthy than is the information he derives from the agenda setter's proposal. Therefore he prefers a committee member who is more to the right, and closer to himself. The formal proof of this can be found in Appendix A.5.
Policy making with an extreme agenda setter
The equilibrium in the policy making process is an extension of Gilligan and Krehbiel's closed rule model (1989). The full mathematical formulation and the proof can be found in Appendix A.1. Figure 4 displays the equilibrium with an extreme agenda setter an oversight committee member C 2L with d L = a. 7 On the horizontal axis the policy result of the status quo, p 0 + !, is displayed. On the vertical axis the equilibrium policy result can be found. It is this that all players care about. For very small and very large values of ! (in intervals I and IV respectively) the agenda setter is able to obtain her ideal policy result aL R . More speci…cally, the agenda setter successfully proposes aL R ! as policy when ! p 0 + aL R and when ! (2d L a)L R p 0 . In those situations the oversight committee member prefers the agenda setter's ideal policy result to the status quo result. The oversight committee member then truthfully report the correct value of ! to its legislators, and the legislators know that the proposal is better for them than is the status quo and vote in favor of the proposal.
the agenda setter cannot attract the support of both oversight committee members by proposing her ideal policy, because oversight committee member C 2L prefers the result of the status quo. Therefore he seeks the support of this oversight committee member by proposing the policy that makes the oversight committee member C 2L indi¤erent to the result of the status quo. Again, both oversight committee members then report the correct value of ! to their legislators; and these legislators vote in favor of the proposal. For all other values of !, in interval III, oversight committee member C 2L is not willing to give a consistent signal because he prefers a move to the left, whereas the agenda setter desires a move to the right. The agenda setter then is unable to signal to the left legislator whether the proposal is bene…cial for him. In the absence of any further information, the left legislator prefers the status quo over any proposal that the agenda setting committee can make. As a result the status quo prevails in interval III. We brie ‡y discuss the equilibrium policy for d 00 L < a, as represented by the mixed line. There are two important consequences of the left legislator's appointment of a more extreme oversight committee member. First, the agenda setter is able to achieve her ideal policy result for fewer status quos. In the Figure we can see this by noting that interval I is smaller under d 00 L < a than under d L = a. This is due to the fact that in equilibrium the agenda setter needs to seek the support of the more extreme oversight committee member. he does this by o¤ering the oversight committee member C 2L a policy that is su¢ ciently to the left so that he will send out a consistent signal !, which induces legislator L L to accept the proposal.
Second, there is less information transmitted by the left legislator's oversight committee member. He will refuse to send out a consistent signal for proposals that are actually bene…cial for the legislator and this e¤ect is more pronounced than with a more moderate oversight committee. We can see this in the Figure by noting that interval III is larger for d 00 L < a than it is for d = a:The e¤ects of having a less extreme oversight committee are the opposite.
Policy making with a moderate agenda setter
We now consider an agenda setter who is located between the two legislators (a 2 [ 1; 1]). For simplicity we continue to assume that the agenda setter is to the right of the midpoint between the two legislators. The analysis for an agenda setter to the left of the midpoint is analogous. Figure 6 displays the equilibrium with a moderate agenda setter and with two types of oversight committee members C 2L and C 2R . Similar as in Figure 5 , the horizontal axis displays the policy result of the status quo, p 0 + !. On the vertical axis the equilibrium policy result can be found. It is this that all players care about. Let us …rst discuss the equilibrium by focusing on the solid line. This line represents the equilibrium with oversight committee members that are equally far away from their legislators than is the agenda setter (d L = (2+a) and d R = (2 a)). For very small and very large values of ! (in intervals I and V respectively) the agenda setter is able to obtain her ideal policy result aL R ; because the oversight committee members prefer it to the status quo result. For values of ! (2d L a)L R p 0 and ! (2d R a)L R p 0 the agenda setter's ideal policy result is attractive enough for the oversight committee members to report the correct value of ! to their legislator L L . The legislators then know that the proposal is better for them than is the status quo and vote in favor of it. In interval II, where (2d L a)L R p 0 < ! d L L R p 0 , the agenda setter cannot attract the support of oversight committee C 2L by proposing her ideal policy, because oversight committee member C 2L prefers the result of the status quo. Therefore he seeks the support of this oversight committee member by proposing the policy that makes the oversight committee member C 2L indi¤er-ent to the result of the status quo. Both oversight committee members then send a consistent signal and the legislators approve the proposal. In interval III the status quo prevails. Either oversight committee member C 2L or oversight committee member C 2R is not willing to give a consistent signal because he prefers a move in one direction of the status quo, whereas the agenda setter desires a move to the other side. The agenda setter is unable to signal to both legislators that the proposal is bene…cial for them. At least one of the legislators prefers the status quo over any proposal that the agenda setter can make and votes against. As a result the status quo prevails. Finally, in interval IV, when d R L R p 0 < ! (2d R a)L R p 0 , the agenda setter is able to attract the support of oversight committee member C 2R by proposing the policy that makes him indi¤erent to the status quo. Both oversight committee members then send a consistent signal, the legislators vote in favor of the proposal, and the proposal is adopted. In the next section we discuss the optimal oversight committee member choices for the legislators.
The oversight committee appointment
In the previous section we mentioned the two e¤ects at play when a legislator appoints an oversight committee member. On the one hand, if the pivotal legislator appoints an oversight committee member who is farther away from the agenda setter than he is himself, there is a wider range of status quo results for which the oversight committee sends no informative signal to the legislator than if the legislator appoints an oversight committee member with preferences identical to his own. Instead of having two sources of information, the proposal and the signal, for that range of status quo results the only informative signal comes from the agenda setter's proposal. As a direct result the status quo is maintained for a wider range of policies. On the other hand appointing such an oversight committee member also shapes the proposals that the agenda setter makes when he can move policy away from the status quo. This renders these proposals more bene…cial for the pivotal legislator. Note that we do not require that the oversight committee members are attributed formal decision making power. The credible commitment to follow the oversight committee member's advice on the side of the legislators stems directly from the asymmetric information. In what follows, we show that indeed it is optimal to appoint a biased committee member. The distributional gains are larger than the informational cost. Contrary to what one might expect, this means that legislators prefer not to have perfect information with regards to the consequences of policy, but to let a strategic committee member transmit this information to them.
Each legislator chooses his own oversight committee member, and this member's signal is only visible to the legislator who appointed him. An oversight committee member's signal thus does not have any impact on the other legislator. Therefore, the legislators appoint the same oversight committee members as they would if they were the only legislator in the policy making process.
s optimal choice and let d R = d R denote legislator L R 's optimal choice when they are pivotal. Proposition 1 characterizes these optimal choices. The proofs can be found in Appendix A.6. Proposition 1 Legislators L L and L R choose oversight committee members C 2L and C 2R who are equally far away from them as is the agenda setter, but in the other direction. If the agenda setter is to a legislator's right, that legislator thus appoints an oversight committee member to his left. The optimal level of extremeness for legislator L L is d L = (2 + a) and the optimal level for legislator
In what follows we explain and discuss the Proposition. We continue to consider agenda setters who are to the right of the midpoint between the two legislators. First, we illustrate that it is indeed worthwhile for legislator L L to source out monitoring to an oversight committee member who is farther away from the agenda setter. 9 The solid line in Figure 7 shows how far the equilibrium policy result is from legislator L L 's ideal policy as a function of the location of the status quo result, if legislator L L appoints an oversight committee member with d L = (2 + a). The horizontal axis displays the status quo result p 0 + !. The vertical axis measures the distance between the result of the equilibrium policy p (b; s 2L ) and the legislator's ideal, For two values of the status quo result does the legislator obtain his ideal policy result: when the status quo result is equal to (2d L + 1)L R ; and when it is equal to L R . Legislator L L obtains her ideal policy result, when it is equal to the status quo result and when the status quo result makes committee member C 2L indi¤erent to legislator L L 's ideal policy result. In intervals I and IV the agenda setter gets her ideal policy result, and the distance between legislator L L 's ideal policy result and the equilibrium policy result is then (1 + a)L R . In interval II the agenda setter attracts the support of oversight committee member C 2L by proposing the policy that makes him indi¤erent to the status quo result. At the left end of the interval this is the agenda setter's ideal policy. As the external shock becomes larger, the agenda setter proposes a policy more to the left. At …rst this brings the equilibrium policy result closer to legislator L L ; but then it moves policy farther away again. At the right end of the interval the agenda setter proposes the status quo result. In interval III the status quo result prevails. Again, the distance to legislator L L 's ideal policy result decreases at the left end of the interval, but then increases again.
The dotted line in Figure 7 shows the equilibrium policy for an oversight committee member C 2L with the same ideal policy result as legislator
Legislator L L then has perfect information due to noiseless information transmission. The equilibrium policy is similar to the equilibrium policy when d L = (2 + a), except in interval II. For d L = 1; the equilibrium policy result is equal to the agenda setter's ideal policy result in interval II. The agenda setter only proposes a compromise when the left legislator prefers the status quo result over the ideal policy result of the agenda setter. The agenda setter knows that this is not the case in interval II and thus successfully proposes her own ideal policy result in interval II. For d L = (2 + a) the agenda setter cannot obtain her ideal in interval II, because the oversight committee member prefers the status quo result. So, in interval II the legislator prefers to source out the monitoring to an oversight committee member to his left, rather than have perfect information. Thus, legislator L L has an incentive to delegate monitoring to an oversight committee member. Legislator L L bene…ts from not knowing the consequences of a policy perfectly well and appointing an oversight committee member who strategically transmits information back to him. The distance between the two lines measures the extent of the bene…ts of outsourcing to an oversight committee member with d L = (2 + a): The bene…ts are strictly positive only in interval II and are measured by the shaded area. If legislator L L has perfect information, the agenda setter extracts most of the surplus created by the new policy, potentially to the extent that the legislator is equally well o¤ with the status quo. If the legislator knows the value of ! perfectly well (either by acquiring perfect information himself or by having an oversight committee with the same ideal policy), as is shown in interval II in Figure 7 , he cannot make a credible commitment to reject marginally improving o¤ers since they provide at least the same utility as the status quo. This is di¤erent when the oversight committee is more extreme, because proposals that are not accompanied by a consistent signal by the oversight committee member will not be accepted. The agenda setter then needs to attract the support of the oversight committee member. he makes a proposal that is marginally attractive to the oversight committee -inducing the oversight committee to accept the proposal and send a consistent signal -but this proposal is much more attractive for the legislator. So by delegating the monitoring to an oversight committee member, the legislator gets a policy result closer to his ideal policy result. Our …ndings extend the results of Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989) . They found that if there is a cost to the agenda setter when he specializes, a closed rule procedure can be more bene…cial than an open rule since it provides incentives for the agenda setter to specialize. Specialization reduces the variance for all players -leading to a higher utility for all. Yet, the cost of specialization born by the agenda setter may outweigh the bene…t from the reduction in variance. As a result, under the open rule the agenda setter may not want to specialize. The closed rule gives the agenda setter a distributional bene…t on top of the variance reduction. The legislator may still bene…t as a result of the variance reduction, in spite of the distributional loss to the agenda setter.
Our results contribute to this literature by showing that there is a middle ground between the two extremes of employing either an open rule, and obtaining no bene…ts from variance reduction or employing a closed rule to secure bene…ts from variance reduction but incurring a distributional loss. By appointing a strategic oversight committee, the legislator can get a policy closer to his own ideal in a closed rule procedure, while still leaving enough incentives to specialize for the agenda setter. This enables the legislator to skim the surplus created by the specialization rather than having the agenda setter capture almost all the distributional bene…ts. If the cost of specialization for the agenda setter is high, the legislator may not want to appoint an oversight committee as extreme as d L = (2 + a). The legislator can look for the most e¢ cient incentives to specialize: if the cost is really low, he can use an open procedure. If the cost of specialization is above a certain threshold, he can use a closed rule procedure in combination with an extreme oversight committee. As the cost increases further, the optimal location of the oversight committee shifts to the right.
We conclude that legislators have incentives to appoint oversight committee members who are biased away from the agenda setter. The extent of the bias is equal to the extent that the legislator and the agenda setter have di¤erent preferences. In the scenario of an extreme right agenda setter, both legislators have an incentive to appoint committee members who are biased to the left. As such they create a credible commitment to reject deals that are only marginally improving over the status quo. What matters for the agenda setter is that he obtains the approval of legislator L L , because legislator L L is farthest away from the agenda setter and his approval is thus more di¢ cult to obtain. Legislator L R approves all proposals that legislator L L approves. For this reason, the agenda setter's optimal proposal strategy is the same as if the left legislator is the only legislator.
These considerations lead to the equilibrium policy result presented in Figure Figure 9 : The equilibrium policy result for an extreme right agenda setter.
9, which is similar to Figure 5 in the previous section. The bold line indicates the equilibrium policy result for d L = (2 + a) whereas the thin line refers to the equilibrium in case of perfect information for legislator L L . Again, the left legislator prefers d L = (2 + a) to having perfect information for all values of the status quo result. On the vertical axis one can see that for each status quo result, the distance between the equilibrium policy result and legislator L L 's ideal is weakly smaller with the biased oversight committee member. On the other hand, the right legislator prefers d L = (2 + a) for small values of the status quo result, but for larger values prefers perfect information. However, he is unable to alter the information the left legislator receives.
A somewhat more complicated scenario occurs when the agenda setter is moderate, with a 2 [ 1; 1]. The left legislator is pivotal for moves to the right. He is unsure whether a policy change in that direction is bene…cial for him. Indeed, proposals that move policy to the right could be too extreme for him. For policy changes in the left direction he has no uncertainty regarding the proposals merit: if the agenda setter prefers a policy to the left of the status quo, the legislator prefers the agenda setter's ideal to the status quo result. The right legislator faces uncertainty for policy changes in the left direction. Indeed, proposals that move to the left could move too far to the left from the right legislator's perspective. For proposals that move to the right, the right legislator is sure that the proposal is improving over the status quo.
The two legislators thus have private incentives to appoint oversight committee members who are biased in opposite directions: the left legislator appoints an oversight committee member who is biased to the left and the right legislator appoints a committee member who is biased to the right. The legislators are pivotal for di¤erent directions of policy changes. These considerations ultimately lead to the equilibrium policy result as presented in Figure 10 . For small values of the status quo result, legislator L L is pivotal because policy changes occur in the right direction. Because of his biased oversight committee member, policies are pulled more to the left than under perfect information. For larger values of the status quo result, legislator L R is pivotal because policy changes happen in the left direction. Again, the biased signal his oversight committee member sends, pulls policies more to the right than under perfect information. As a result, the range of the proposals that is broader with biased oversight committee members than it would be if the legislators were perfectly informed. Paradoxical as it may seem, both legislators prefer the other one to be perfectly informed while receiving a biased signal themselves. In such as situation they can pull proposals more in the direction they are pivotal for, while avoiding extreme policies when the other legislator is pivotal.
Conclusion
In this paper we develop a model that evaluates the strategic considerations involved in the legislature's appointment of an oversight committee as an instrument to monitor an agenda setter. This situation is representative of EU external trade policy. In the EU the Council appoints a TPC to monitor the agenda setting Commission.
We present a game-theoretical model with asymmetric information. In it, oversight committee members are appointed, whose sole function is to provide legislators with information regarding the consequences of policy. Our …ndings are that legislators have powerful incentives to appoint oversight committee members that have di¤erent preferences than themselves. The direction of this bias is in opposite direction away from the appointing legislator than is the agenda setter. The oversight committee member that is appointed by a legislator is biased to the same extent as the agenda setter's preferences di¤er from the legislator's.
Asymmetric information can serve as a commitment tool just as delegation to more extreme veto players can be. In equilibrium we …nd that legislators only accept a proposals that their respective oversight committee member prefers over the status quo. Therefore, the agenda setter wants to attract the support of the oversight committee members. When the committee members are biased, the proposal the agenda setter makes is only marginally improving over the status quo for the pivotal oversight committee member, but is much more bene…cial from the viewpoint of the pivotal legislator. This might account for the noisy information transmission that we referred to in the introduction: legislators must indeed do their best to …nd out what is happening in the policy making.
In the EU the member states bene…t from having a TPC. Not only is reduced uncertainty bene…cial for all members, it also ensures that more policies bene…cial to a supermajority of members are accepted. Moreover, having a biased oversight committee member ensures that the proposals are not pulled too far away from what a legislator wants.
A.1 Equilibrium with extreme agenda setter
The equilibrium for an agenda setter to the right is characterized in Proposition 2. The proof can be found in Appendix A.3.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the agenda setter is to the pivotal legislators' right. Suppose furthermore that oversight committee members are to left of the legislators who appoint them, but not farther away from these legislators than is the agenda setter, that is,
. The agenda setter then obtains her ideal policy result, if both oversight committee members prefer it to the status quo result. By contrast, the status quo result prevails, if the agenda setter and at least one of the oversight committee members want to move in opposite directions away from the status quo result. Otherwise the policy that makes the oversight committee member furthest away from the agenda setter indi¤ erent to the status quo is adopted. In particular, an equilibrium with an informed agenda setter and two informed oversight committee members, and a legislative body that uses supermajority rule consists of the following strategies and beliefs:
The equilibrium proposal strategy:
The equilibrium signalling strategies:
The equilibrium beliefs:
The equilibrium voting strategies:
and
And the equilibrium policy is:
A.2 Equilibrium with moderate agenda setter
The equilibrium for a moderate agenda setter is characterized in Proposition 3.The proof of the Proposition can be found in Appendix A.4.
Proposition 3
Suppose that the agenda setter is moderate and closer to the right than left pivotal legislator. Suppose furthermore that the oversight committee members are at the other sides of their legislators than is the agenda setter, and closer to them than is the agenda setter, that is, d L 2 [ (2 + a); 1] and d R 2 [1; 2 a]. The agenda setter then obtains her ideal policy result, if both oversight committee members prefer it to the status quo result. By contrast, the status quo prevails, if the agenda setter and at least one oversight committee member want to move in opposite directions away from the status quo. Otherwise the policy that makes the oversight committee member that is pivotal in the direction of the policy change indi¤ erent to the status quo is adopted. In particular, an equilibrium with an informed agenda setter and two informed oversight committee members, and a legislature that uses supermajority rule consists of the following strategies and beliefs:
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We divide our analysis of the equilibrium in several sections.
1. We start to look at the equilibrium where C 1 is able to propose its ideal location.
(a) The …rst place where it can do so, is if b < p 0 . If C 1 makes such a proposal, it must mean that p 0 + ! > aL R . In that situation, all interest are aligned and all players should prefer the ideal point of C 1 , which corresponds to b = aL R !, so that the result of this proposal is the ideal location of C 1 . Since also C 2L and C 2R bene…ts from this proposal, they send out the true signal signal s = ! = aL R b. Observing b < p 0 and s 2L = aL R b and s 2R = aL R b, the legislators accept b.
(b) There is also another way C 1 could get its ideal location. C 2L is the most remote player whose support the agenda setter needs to attract. Therefore, if a proposal is in the acceptance set of C 2L , it is bene…cial for all players. This is possible as long as C 2L accepts this b over the status quo
is happy with b = aL R ! and gives a true signal s 2L = ! = aL R b. Also C 2R prefers this proposal over the status quo, so he also sends out s 2R = aL R b Since b = aL R !, it is so that ! = aL R b, such that if the legislators observe
and the described signal, they will accept the proposal.
For an
To attract the support of C 2L , the agenda setter makes a proposal C 2L is indi¤erent over with respect to the status quo. This is only possible when
This will be the proposal as long as C 2L can accept it, so as long as
and C 2R are satis…ed and they give a true signal. This is also a good thing for the legislators, so when they observe a proposal that corresponds with this situation,
3. The only thing left to discuss is what happens for ! 2 (d L L R p 0 ; aL R p 0 ). In this segment, there is no signal given by C 2L , so legislator L L knows that ! must fall in this interval. There is still room for proposals as long as p 0 + ! < L R , as then all player -besides C 2L of course -will want a move to the right. However, since setting a proposal b gives also information on the value of !, C 1 could potentially set a large b to signal a low ! and to fool the legislature. Fooling happens only if C 1 has an incentive to fool: as long as it could not set its ideal point if L L knew the true value of
So if ! > (2 + a)L R p 0 , the agenda setter has an incentive to fool. It is now easy to see that for all remaining ! 2 (d L L R p 0 ; aL R p 0 ), C 1 has an incentive to fool the legislature if d L (2+a), since then the legislature knows that -in absence of a consistent signal -! > (2 + a)L R p 0 . As such, it is clear to see that L L prefers to choose the status quo in the remaining cases, based on the prior.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. This is the proof of Proposition 3. We divide our analysis of the equilibrium in several sections.
1. We start to look at the equilibrium where C 1 is able to propose its ideal location. It can do so when it is in the acceptance set of the two extreme oversight committee members.
(a) The …rst place where both oversight committee members accept it, if is the status quo result is very far to the right of C 2R . Then all players prefer the agenda setter's ideal over the status quo result. This happens when
So in that situation, b = aL R !. Since both C 2L and C 2R bene…t from this proposal, they send out a true signal s 2L = s 2R = ! = aL R b. When the legislators observe
and a signal from their respective oversight committee member as described above, they accept the proposal.
(b) The second place where both oversight committee members accept the agenda setter's ideal is if it is very far to the left of C 2L . Then all players prefer the agenda setter's ideal over the status quo result. This happens when
Since both C 2L and C 2R bene…t from this proposal, they send out a true signal
For an
, oversight committee member no longer prefers the agenda setter's ideal. However, the agenda setter can attract the support of C 2L by making a proposal this oversight committee member is indi¤erent over with respect to the status quo. This is only possible when p 0 + ! d L L R and results in the following proposal
Again, both oversight committee members C 2L and C 2R prefer this proposal over the status quo and give a true signal on !. So when the legislators observe a proposal that corresponds with this situation,
d L L R they will accept the proposal.
, oversight committee member no longer prefers the agenda setter's ideal. However, the agenda setter can attract the support of C 2R by making a proposal this oversight committee member is indi¤erent over with respect to the status quo. This is only possible when p 0 + ! d R L R and results in the following proposal
This will be the proposal as long as C 2R can accept it, so as long as p 0 +! d L L R , and until b + ! = aL R , which happens when ! = (2d R a)L R p 0 . Again, both oversight committee members C 2L and C 2R prefer this proposal over the status quo and give a true signal on !. So when the legislators observe a proposal that corresponds with this situation,
d R L R they will accept the proposal.
The only thing left to discuss is what happens for
. In this segment, there is either no signal given by C 2L , or no signal by C 2R . Therefore there is always one legislator that, in accordance to the previous proof, prefers the status quo in absence of an informative signal by his oversight committee member. Therefore the status quo prevails in those situations.
A.5 Proof of bounds on d L
Proof. First we discuss the lower bound on d L , then we discuss the upper bound.
1. We will discuss what happens in the models if d L < (2 + a). In the hypothesized equilibrium, most remains the same as in the previous case. So if the legislature observes that the non-agenda setting committee gives an inconsistent !, it knows that ! 2 ( (2 + a)L R ; L R ). Yet it becomes possible to submit a non-fooling proposal, for dL R < p 0 + ! < (2 + a)L R . So …rst we look at for which values of ! that C 1 will want to cheat. This is when the agenda setting committee would not be able to set its ideal policy if L L knew the value of !.
Therefore, as we have discussed before, if d L < (2 + a), there exists a value of ! that has not yet been signaled by the oversight committee for which the agenda setter doesn't need to cheat. So the next question is which proposals could only be made if ! < (2 + a)L R p 0 . It is clear that this is when jb + !; aL R j jp 0 + !; aL
However, these proposals constitute a credible commitment on behalf of the agenda setter. It commits to a large proposal to signal that ! is low. But this signal is expensive for both the agenda setter as the legislator, since both would prefer a proposal more to the left. Therefore the left legislator L L prefers to set d L = (2+a) over any d L < (2 + a): it leads to a proposal that is at maximum as far away from the legislator as the the agenda setter's ideal, whereas as non-fooling proposal would always be at or beyond the agenda setter's ideal. p 0 + ! (2 + a)L R . This is when the status quo result is so far to the left that L L prefers the agenda setter's ideal over the status quo result. In this situation legislator L L is indi¤erent between d L = 1 and d L > 1. In both cases the agenda setter proposes his ideal and all players accept.
. This is when the status quo is to legislator L L 's left such that he prefers the status quo over the agenda setter's ideal. If d L = 1, the legislator is perfectly informed and the agenda setter makes drafts a proposal that makes the agenda setter indi¤erent over it and the status quo. If d L > 1, the signal by the oversight committee member is uninformative. Believing the signal of the oversight committee member C 2L cannot be part of an equilibrium because then the agenda setter would make a proposal that makes committee member C 2L indi¤erent over it and the status quo. If legislator L L would then be better o¤ to vote against it and not to follow the oversight committee member's advice. So the legislator strictly prefers to have d L = 1 over d L > 1.
The legislator wants to move in a di¤erent direction away from the status quo than do his oversight committee member and the agenda setter. Therefore he cannot trust the signal of a committee member with d L > 1. Therefore he strictly prefers to have d L = 1 over d L > 1. 
A.6 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We discuss what happens if there is an extreme right agenda setting committee. To calculate the optimal position of C 2L from L L 's viewpoint, we …rst look at his expected utility in terms of d L :
After taking the …rst derivative and solving for d L , we …nd that the utility maximizing ) . However, the location of the oversight committee member C 2R has no in ‡uence on the expected utility. Therefore, every location of d R 2 [1; 2 a] is supported as an equilibrium. We now discuss what happens if there is a moderate agenda setting committee. To calculate the optimal position of C 2L from L L 's viewpoint, we …rst look at his expected utility in terms of d L :
Next we look for the value of d L that maximizes this expression. After taking the …rst derivative and solving for d L , we …nd that the utility maximizing d L for L L equals d L = (2 + a). To …nd the optimal d R from the viewpoint of legislator L R , we look at his expected utility function in terms of d R :
Next we look for the value of d R that maximizes this expression. After taking the …rst derivative and solving for d R , we …nd that the utility maximizing d R for L R equals d R = 2 a.
